

Bicycle Advisory Committee
CORRESPONDENCE

as of May 16, 2017

Tietjen, Brent

From: Adrian Brandt <adrian.brandt@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, May 14, 2017 11:10 AM
To: Caltrain, Bac (@caltrain.com)
Subject: Gross bike capacity per new EMU train up or down?

Dear Caltrain Bicycle Advisory Committee members:

As page 15 of the [minutes of the July 2, 2015, JPB meeting](#) shows, after lengthy discussion, and public input, and a failed motion to adopt a 9:1 ratio, the board unanimously passed a motion to adopt an 8:1 seats:bike-spaces ratio for the EMUs.

Since we've currently got 80 bike spaces per train, this means 640 (8 x 80) seats per EMU are required to merely preserve the existing 80 spaces per train. So, ironically, reduction of bike spaces is an unintended and underappreciated side-effect of reducing seats in favor of more standing space.

The folly of basing bike spaces on a ratio to seats is illustrated most clearly in that if all seats were eliminated to maximize passenger capacity, onboard bike spaces could be eliminated while remaining in full compliance with the agreed-to 8:1 ratio!

Oops! Bikes on Board advocates should've thought of this and sought a metric that wasn't solely tied to seats and somehow factored in train capacity ...

Tietjen, Brent

From: Adrian Brandt <adrian.brandt@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, May 14, 2017 11:01 AM
To: cacsecretary (@caltrain.com); Caltrain, Bac (@caltrain.com)
Cc: Shirley Johnson; Adina Levin; Marc Brandt
Subject: Eliminate or improve SF bike lockers?

Dear Caltrain Bicycle and Citizen Advisory Committee members,

Upon reviewing [the upcoming May 17, 2017, Caltrain CAC meeting agenda](#), I was alarmed to read the included April meeting minutes "STAFF REPORT" section (PDF page 7) where Mr. Joe Navarro, Directory of Rail Transportation, said that:

"... the San Francisco bike lockers are getting vandalized quite often so staff may be removing the lockers and possibly adding an Uber drop off location."

Why not address the vandalism instead of doing away with a valuable customer amenity?

This seems to clearly signal that bike lockers are an unimportant and/or unvalued amenity. I can't imagine staff proposing to remove other station or onboard amenities such as seats, windows, bathrooms, signage, TVMs, Clipper terminals, fences, shelters, parking or lighting as a response to vandalism.

And if the bike lockers are underused, is it because they're not being kept secure and in good operating condition, or because they require an onerous and resource inefficient "one-user, one-locker" long-term lease (vs. electronic on-demand first-come, first-serve day-use [BikeLink](#) technology [such as BART is using](#))?

Kind Regards,
Adrian Brandt

Tietjen, Brent

From: M.J.R. Sloothaak <mjrsloothaak@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2017 10:11 AM
To: Caltrain, Bac (@caltrain.com)
Subject: Tip about bicycle gutters

@Caltrain the stairs @ station 22nd st are bike unfriendly! Put some bicycle gutters, like what we in Holland do;)



Tietjen, Brent

From: Roland Lebrun <ccss@msn.com>
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2017 3:12 AM
To: Supervisor Aaron Peskin
Cc: MTC Commission; CHSRA Board; Board (@caltrain.com); Nila Gonzales; VTA Board Secretary; SFCTA CAC; cacsecretary (@caltrain.com); Caltrain, Bac (@caltrain.com); cac@transbaycenter.org
Subject: Item# 14. Update on California High-Speed Rail
Attachments: Item# 14. Update on California High-Speed Rail.pdf

Dear Supervisor Peskin and Members of the SFCTA Board of Directors,

Please find attached comments/questions for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Roland Lebrun

CC
Metropolitan Transportation Commission
High Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors
Caltrain Board
TJPA Board of Directors
VTA Board
SFCTA CAC
Caltrain CAC
Caltrain BAC
TJPA CAC

Roland Lebrun
CCSS@MSN.com
April 24, 2017

SFCTA Board of Directors April 25 Meeting

Item# 14. Update on California High-Speed Rail

Dear Chair Peskin and Members of the SFCTA Board of Directors,

Thank you for inviting the High Speed Rail Authority to provide an update on the San Francisco to San Jose section.

Here are my comments/questions for your consideration:

- Slide 3 of the presentation states that the \$20.7B San Jose to Bakersfield project is “fully fundable”. Why isn’t this project “fully funded” and what would it take to make it so?
- Slide 5 mentions \$713 Million for Peninsula Corridor Electrification Program (PCEP). Shouldn’t this slide reflect the fact that the Secretary of State deferred the allocation of \$600M in Prop1A bonds to the PCEP pending approval of a \$647M Full Funding Grant Agreement by the Federal Transit Administration?
- Slide 10: Would the Authority consider relocating its maintenance facility from Brisbane to Amtrak’s former Oakland location if the Transbay Transit Center was connected to the East Bay via a new Transbay tube and, if so, would the Authority consider being a funding partner in such a tube?
- Slide 11: Why does the slide refer to “3 planned grade separation projects” when San Mateo’s 28th and 31st Avenues currently dead-end at the tracks and the project actually entails elevating the tracks to accommodate a \$180M relocation of the Hillsdale Caltrain station?
- Slide 11: How does the City of San Mateo plan to fund the \$180M Hillsdale station relocation given that the High Speed Rail Authority’s Board of Directors refused to sign off on the MOU which would have allocated \$84M in Prop1A Bonds to the project?
- Slide 12: Why is the Authority not considering implementing intrusion detection devices capable of stopping approaching trains if the tracks are obstructed by vehicles and/or pedestrians?
- Slide 13 depicts a 4th & King high speed rail station. How can this be funded given that the Bond Act mandates that the northern terminus be located at the Transbay Transit Center and how does Mr. Tripousis account for potential throwaway costs in excess of \$100M while the DTX is under construction?

- Slide 14: Why are the Bi-monthly City/County Staff Coordinating Group (CSCG) Meetings not open to the general public?

- Does the Authority intend to comply with the constraints of the Bond act? If not, why not and, if yes, how does the Authority propose to design and implement a primarily two-track blended system capable of supporting 12 trains/hour/direction between San Francisco and San Jose?
- Why are the High Speed Rail Authority consultants mandating 30-foot diameter 200 MPH tunnels for San Francisco when European engineers specify 24-foot 140 MPH tunnels in urban areas?
- Why is Mr. Tripousis seeking a position on the TJPA Board of Directors? Is this a condition attached to the allocation of Prop1A Bonds to the DTX and, if so, under which mandate?
- Why are the High Speed Rail consultants expecting Caltrain to raise platforms to a height of 50 inches at a cost of tens of millions of dollars and to procure trains with two sets of doors (resulting in the loss of 60-80 seat per train) instead of complying with the Authority's Peer Review Group's recommendations to the Legislature?
"We have recommended in past letters that the Authority consider adopting bi-level trains from the outset because the loading platform level would be consistent with the lower level used by Caltrain and Metrolink (and ACE if there are joint operations in future). In our discussions, the Authority indicated that they will consider inputs from the new system operator (discussed below). We recommend that this issue be addressed carefully before HSRA commits itself to a rolling stock fleet design"
<http://www.cahsrprg.com/files/PRG-letter-of-7-Feb-2017-Reduced.pdf> (page 3)

Respectfully presented for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Roland Lebrun.

CC
Metropolitan Transportation Commission
High Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors
Caltrain Board
TJPA Board of Directors
VTA Board
SFCTA CAC
Caltrain CAC
Caltrain BAC
TJPA CAC

Tietjen, Brent

From: Scott Yarbrough <yarbrough.scott@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2017 5:27 PM
To: Caltrain, Bac (@caltrain.com); Board (@caltrain.com)
Subject: another early departure

Train 269 dept time on schedule = 5:20

Doors were closed with a live time listed on your board as 5:19

I know your system likely shows a 5:20 real time departure from Palo Alto, but that time is meaningless if the conductors close the doors early

Tietjen, Brent

From: Roland Lebrun <ccss@msn.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2017 3:42 AM
To: Board (@caltrain.com)
Cc: MTC Commission; SFCTA Board Secretary; VTA Board Secretary; Nila Gonzales; CHSRA Board; SFCTA CAC; cacsecretary (@caltrain.com); Caltrain, Bac (@caltrain.com); cac@transbaycenter.org
Subject: Item 9.b Status of Caltrain FFGA
Attachments: Item 9.b Status of Caltrain FFGA.pdf; Caltrain EMU railcar procurement.pdf

Dear Chair Gee,

Further to my letter of July 5th to the Metropolitan Transportation Commission highlighting multiple irregularities with the Caltrain EMU procurement, please find attached an analysis of irregularities with the FTA Core Capacity grant application, namely an apparently deliberate misrepresentation of Caltrain's current peak seated capacity.

Sincerely,

Roland Lebrun.

CC
MTC commission
SFCTA Board of Directors
VTA Board of Directors
Transbay Joint Powers Authority Board of Directors
High Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors
SFCTA CAC
Caltrain CAC
Caltrain BPAC
TJPA CAC

From: Roland Lebrun <ccss@msn.com>
Sent: Wednesday, July 6, 2016 1:13 AM
To: MTC Commission
Cc: SFCTA Board Secretary; VTA Board Secretary; Nila Gonzales; Caltrain Board; CHSRA Board; SFCTA CAC; Caltrain CAC Secretary; Caltrain BAC
Subject: Caltrain EMU railcar procurement

Dear Honorable Chair Cortese and MTC Commissioners,

Further to my comments during the June Commission Meeting, the intent of the attached letter is to substantiate and elaborate on the concerns I expressed about the Caltrain Modernization (CalMod) project, specifically the cost and reduced capacity of the proposed Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) railcars (550-seat trains replacing 650-seat trains operating at 158% of capacity).

The letter concludes with the following recommendations:

- Launch an immediate investigation into the procurement process
 - Suspend any funding pending the outcome of the investigation
 - Reach out to the 5 manufacturers, who responded to the RFI and inquire as to the events that led them not to respond to the RFP
 - Invite Stadler to provide a comparative breakdown of recent Stadler KISS procurements
 - Determine if the \$225M discrepancy is related to customization for High Speed Rail and revise CHSRA's contribution to the funding package accordingly
 - Initiate an independent Caltrain capacity analysis to inform on the next steps
 - Consider appointing an interim entity responsible for Caltrain administration (per Section 6.B of the 1996 Peninsula Corridor Project Joint Powers Agreement)
- [http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Public/JPA Agreement and Amendment 10-03-1996.pdf](http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Public/JPA_Agreement_and_Amendment_10-03-1996.pdf)

PDF Agreement, 1.42MB - Caltrain

www.caltrain.com

Created Date: 3/10/2011 1:59:22 PM

Respectfully submitted for your consideration

Sincerely,

Roland Lebrun

CC
SFCTA Board of Directors
VTA Board of Directors
Transbay Joint Powers Authority Board of Directors
Caltrain Board of Directors
High Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors
SFCTA CAC
Caltrain CAC
Caltrain BPAC

Caltrain April 2017 Board meeting
Agenda Item #9.b PCEP FFGA update

Roland Lebrun
ccss@msn.com
April 5 2017

Dear Chair Gee and members of the Caltrain Board of Directors,

Further to my July 5th 2016 letter of to the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (attached) which highlighted multiple irregularities with the Caltrain EMU procurement, including the capacity of Stadler KISS railcars which **“cannot possibility meet Caltrain’s present let alone future capacity requirements”** (page 4), there is now evidence of irregularities with the actual \$647M FTA Core Capacity grant application.

Background

The guidelines for FTA Core Capacity Grants are contained in a document entitled “Final Interim Policy Guidance Federal Transit Administration Capital Investment Grant Program (June 2016)”

(https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/docs/FAST_Updated_Interim_Policy_Guidance_June%202016.pdf), specifically the section on **Determining Core Capacity Project Eligibility and Verifying Proposed Project Increases Capacity by at Least 10 Percent** on page 84.

“For LRT or heavy rail projects, using a calculation method similar to the one described above, FTA evaluates peak hour person capacity in the peak direction in the corridor once the proposed project is completed and open for service to determine whether the project increases capacity by at least 10 percent. Project sponsors submit information on the estimated trains per peak hour in the peak direction, cars per train in the peak direction, and rail car dimensions that would be in place when construction on the proposed project is completed and opened for service. FTA then determines whether the proposed project improves the useable space per existing passenger in the peak hour in the peak direction by at least 10 percent.”

Similarly, for commuter rail projects, using a calculation method similar to the one described above, FTA evaluates the peak hour peak direction seated load after the proposed project is completed and open for service to determine whether the project increase capacity by at least 10 percent. Project sponsors submit information on equipment design, train consists, and trains per peak hour that would be in place when construction on the proposed project is completed and opened for service.”

On or about **October 2nd 2016**, the San Mateo County District (SamTrans), acting in its capacity as the current administrator of the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (PCJPB) submitted an application for a \$647M FTA Core Capacity grant based on **February 2014 figures**, “a month with generally lower ridership”.

The information provided by SamTrans shows that a total of 5 trains with a combined capacity of 3,403 seats (“Detail of Existing Operations”) in the 7:00 AM peak northbound direction would be replaced by 6 trains with a combined capacity of 3,768 seats (“Detail of Operations At Project Opening”), an increase of 365 seats or 11%.

The issue is that the information presented in "Details of Existing Operations" on page 3 of the FTA grant application is inconsistent with the February 2016 Annual Passenger Count presented to the Caltrain Board of directors on May 5th 2016, specifically that train #217 had 650 seats (not 605) and train #225 had 762 seats (not 620)

CORE CAPACITY PROJECT DESCRIPTION TEMPLATE (Page 3)										
Detail of Existing Operations				Heavy Rail/Light Rail			Commuter Rail			
Train #	Train Line Reference (e.g. Name/Color/Number)	Departure Time	Number of Cars	Car Length (ft)	Car Length (in)	Car Width (ft)	Car Width (in)	Usable Space	Seats per Car	Seats Per Train
1	#217	6:57	5						121	605
2	#319	7:03	6						132	792
3	#221	7:18	5						120	600
4	#323	7:45	6						131	786
5	#225	7:50	5						124	620

Detail of Operations At Project Opening				Heavy Rail/Light Rail			Commuter Rail			
Train #	Line Reference	Departure Time	Number of Cars	Car Length (ft)	Car Length (in)	Car Width (ft)	Car Width (in)	Usable Space	Seats per Car	Seats Per Train
1	#305	7:00	6						134	804
2	#113	7:07	6						93	558
3	#115	7:12	6						93	558
4	#307	7:29	6						122	732
5	#117	7:36	6						93	558
6	#119	7:42	6						93	558

<https://goo.gl/R9QKFy>



2016 Top 10 Trains: Maximum Load

Northbound				
Train No.	Depart SJ	Max Load	Train Seating Capacity	Percent of Seated Capacity
319	7:03 AM	951	762	125%
323	7:45 AM	950	762	125%
329	8:03 AM	882	762	116%
375	5:23 PM	841	762	110%
217	6:57 AM	818	650	126%
225	7:50 AM	764	762	100%
269	4:39 PM	756	762	99%
313	6:45 AM	747	762	98%
233	8:40 AM	722	650	111%
215	6:50 AM	719	650	111%

<http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Agendas+and+Minutes/JPB/Board+of+Directors/Presentations/2016/2016-05-05+Annual+Counts.pdf>

The table on page 34 additionally shows that train #221 had 650 seats (not 600).

221	7:18a	492	650	76%	1,046
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(<http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Marketing/caltrain/pdf/2016/2016Annual+Passenger+Counts.pdf>),

Last but not least, train #217 was upgraded to a 6-car Bombardier 762 seats on July 25 2016

[http://www.caltrain.com/about/MediaRelations/News Archive/Caltrain to Swap Train Sets This Month for More Capacity and Maintenance.html](http://www.caltrain.com/about/MediaRelations/NewsArchive/Caltrain%20to%20Swap%20Train%20Sets%20This%20Month%20for%20More%20Capacity%20and%20Maintenance.html)

Based on the above figures, Caltrain's current 7:00 AM northbound peak capacity is

- #217 (762 seats)
- #319 (792 seats)
- #221 (650 seats)
- #323 (786 seats)
- #225 (762 seats)
- Total 3,752 (not 3,403) seats

Conclusion:

The proposed project increases Caltrain's peak AM capacity by 16 seats (3,768-3,752) or less than 1% as a result of which **the project does not qualify for an FTA Core Capacity Grant.**

Recommendation

Terminate all activities with Stadler Rail effective immediately for convenience.
Terminate contract with DC LLC (Dave Couch) for cause.
Terminate all contracts with LTK Engineering for cause.
Consider initiating litigation against DC LLC, LTK Engineering and the San Mateo County Transit District for breach of trust.

Respectfully submitted for your consideration.

Roland Lebrun.

CC

SFCTA Board of Directors

VTA Board of Directors

Transbay Joint Powers Authority Board of Directors

Caltrain Board of Directors

High Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors

SFCTA CAC

Caltrain CAC

Caltrain BPAC

Roland Lebrun
ccss@msn.com
July 5 2016

Metropolitan Transportation Commission
375 Beale Street
San Francisco
CA 94105-2066

Dear Honorable Chair Cortese and MTC Commissioners,

Further to my comments during the June Commission Meeting, the intent of this letter is to substantiate and elaborate on the concerns I expressed about the Caltrain Modernization (CalMod) project, specifically the cost and reduced capacity of the proposed Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) railcars (550-seat trains replacing 650-seat trains operating at 158% of capacity).

This letter concludes with a recommendation that MTC and the FTA suspend all funding and initiate an independent investigation into the Caltrain EMU procurement process.

Background

March 2012

LTK Engineering (LTK) releases a document entitled "Caltrain/California HSR Blended Operations Analysis"

<http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Caltrain+Modernization+Program/Documents/Final-Caltrain-California+HSR+Blended+Operations+Analysis.pdf>

Section 3.3 Rolling Stock on page 28 states "*Caltrain is planning to use 8 car trains to augment the seating capacity of an existing 5 car train*".

The document additionally states (page 38). "*To ensure conservative simulation results, all trains were simulated with a full seated load of 948 passengers (for an 8-car EMU)*".

March 6th 2014

The JPB awards a total of \$42.3M in contracts to LTK, including a \$33.2M EMU Vehicle Consultant Service contract.

<http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Agendas+and+Minutes/JPB/Board+of+Directors/Agendas/2014/3-6-14+JPB+Agenda.pdf> (item #13).


It should be noted that LTK were the sole respondent to the RFP and there is strong circumstantial evidence suggesting that LTK were responsible for drafting this RFP.

May 22 2014

Caltrain issues a Request for Information (RFI) to the EMU manufacturers
http://www.tillier.net/stuff/caltrain/EMU_RFI.pdf

Section 6.6 "EMUs must satisfy JPB's fleet management and operations service plan needs" shows a 6-car EMU configuration with capacity for 600 seats, 48 bikes and 2 ADA bathrooms.

Future Fleet (simplified - conceptual)



Parameter	Gallery Train	Bi-Level Train	EMU Train
Seated capacity	636	822	600
ADA compliance	4 cars per train	All cars	All cars
Bike capacity	80 per train	48 per train	48 per train minimum
Number in service	4 trains	6 trains	16 trains

May 20 2015

Board workshop presentation highlighting 650-seat trains operating at over 150% of capacity during the peak summer season:

Standees: 2015 Maximum Loads

Northbound		
Depart SJ	Percent of Seated Capacity (low season)	Percent of Seated Capacity (high season)
7:03 AM	135%	158%
7:45 AM	128%	150%
8:03 AM	127%	149%
5:23 PM	122%	143%
6:57 AM	122%	142%
7:50 AM	117%	137%
6:45 AM	108%	126%
6:50 AM	106%	124%
4:39 PM	106%	124%
7:55 AM	103%	121%
8:40 AM	102%	119%
4:23 PM	96%	113%

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Issues

1) Capacity

This EMU procurement cannot possibly meet Caltrain's present let alone future capacity requirements (450 seats/train vs. 948 modeled back in March 2012).

2) Costs

This procurement is approximately \$225M (70%) above similar procurements in Europe

Client	Manufacturer/model	Year	Contract (\$M)	#units	Unit cost	Reference
SNCF Lux	Stadler KISS	2010	\$84	24	3.49	http://www.railway-technology.com/ne
Deutsche Bahn	Bombardier Twindexx	2011	\$483	137	3.53	http://www.railway-technology.com/pr
Deutsche Bahn	Bombardier Twindexx	2012	\$210	64	3.28	http://www.railway-technology.com/pr
STIF & SNCF	Bombardier Omneo	2015	\$442	168	2.63	http://www.railway-technology.com/ne
AeroExpress	Stadler KISS	2016	\$205	62	3.31	http://www.railway-technology.com/ne
SNCF	Bombardier Omneo	2016	\$38	16	2.38	http://www.railway-technology.com/ne
Caltrain	Stadler KISS	2016	\$551	96	5.74	http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/_Ag

3) Non-competitive bidding (Stadler was the only responsive bid).

This is identical to what happened at SMART and eBART.

Recommendations

- Launch an immediate investigation into the procurement process
- Suspend any funding pending the outcome of the investigation
- Reach out to the 5 manufacturers, who responded to the RFI and inquire as to the events that led them not to respond to the RFP
- Invite Stadler to provide a comparative breakdown of recent Stadler KISS procurements
- Determine if the \$225M discrepancy is related to customization for High Speed Rail and revise CHSRA's contribution to the funding package accordingly
- Initiate an independent Caltrain capacity analysis to inform on the next steps
- Consider appointing an interim entity responsible for Caltrain administration (per Section 6.B of the 1996 Peninsula Corridor Project Joint Powers Agreement)
[http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Public/JPA Agreement and Amendment 10-03-1996.pdf](http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/Public/JPA%20Agreement%20and%20Amendment%2010-03-1996.pdf)

Respectfully submitted for your consideration

Sincerely,

Roland Lebrun

August 2015


Caltrain releases a Request for Proposal (RFP) to the EMU manufacturers

<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/az34k161d28ah78/AACzwbjBH37v79hHRow8r2LZa?dl=0>

Volume 3 (Tech specs) APPENDIX A (page 468) states that seated capacity (AW1) is "assumed to be **550 passengers**" (100 seats less than trains operating at over 150% of capacity).

May 5th 2016

Caltrain releases annual passenger counts showing massive overcrowding on 762-seat bi-level and 650-seat Gallery trains. It should be noted that Caltrain annual passenger counts are (inexplicably) collected during the low season (February).



2016 Top 10 Trains: Maximum Load

Northbound				
Train No.	Depart SJ	Max Load	Train Seating Capacity	Percent of Seated Capacity
319	7:03 AM	951	762	125%
323	7:45 AM	950	762	125%
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269	4:39 PM	756	762	99%
313	6:45 AM	747	762	98%
233	8:40 AM	722	650	111%
215	6:50 AM	719	650	111%

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July 1st 2016

Caltrain announces that the only responder to the EMU RFP is Stadler Rail and that it intends to proceed with a \$551M procurement of 16 6-car KISS EMUs with 550 seats (before removing approximately 100 seats to allow access to another set of doors).

CC

SFCTA Board of Directors

VTA Board of Directors

Transbay Joint Powers Authority Board of Directors

Caltrain Board of Directors

High Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors

SFCTA CAC

Caltrain CAC

Caltrain BPAC